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Russia's Napoleonic experience was traumatic but brief. Obviously, I am drawn to the impact of a single year or, rather, of six months -June to December 1812 -the time in which Napoleonic forces were on the territory of the Russian Empire. Napoleon had no plans to occupy any part of Great Russia permanently; necessity obliged him to set up a temporary administration in Smolensk, but this was purely an attempt to maintain order and to secure supplies; 1 there was no attempt to challenge the social or legal order, and in particular the institution of serfdom. Napoleon wanted to force Alexander to conform to the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit, and in particular to enforce the Continental System. He did not want to overthrow the Russian regime or the social order. Nevertheless, Russia's Napoleonic experience was not irrelevant; on the contrary, this period marked a significant stage in the development of the relationship between society and the state and in the growth of the concept of Russian nationhood.
Russia before 1812: Napoleon, state and society
Before 1812, the impact of the Napoleonic regime on Russia was slight. It is true that the necessity of war obliged the state to increase the burdens on society by imposing additional recruit levies 2 and by increasing taxation.
3 Adherence to the Continental System after 1807 also obliged the state, at least in principle, to assert greater control over trade, but such activities did not constitute any fundamental or ideological change in government policy. Of more significance was that Alexander, educated by the republican César de la Harpe, expressed an admiration for constitutions of a Napoleonic nature, a subject which he not only dis- reign, but about which he apparently enthused during his meeting with Napoleon at Tilsit. His first minister, Mikhail Speransky, was commissioned, secretly, in 1809 to devise a constitution for Russia. Speransky's proposed constitution was influenced by English writers and practice but also by the French constitution of 1799.
4 Speransky also devised a law code for Russia in 1812 which used Napoleon's Civil Code as a framework. But Speransky's constitution was not made public and only a minor aspect of it was implemented (the establishment of a State Council). His law code was approved but was never introduced; in fact, it was a rushed piece of work which attempted to fit Russian laws artificially into the appropriate paragraphs of the French Code and could never have provided a firm basis for Russian legal practice (Russian laws were codified fully only in the reign of Nicholas I).
The impact of Napoleon on Russian society was also limited before 1812. The Russian educated elite -often well travelled, well read and French-speaking -were aware of the constitutional, legal and social changes enacted by the French Revolution and the Napoleonic regime. But concrete proposals for constitutional change in Russia came in this period from Alexander and his advisors under his instruction (not only by Speransky but also by John Capodistrias in the Ionian islands in 1803 and 1806), and were not articulated by Russian intellectuals in the journals or literary circles of the time. The early years of the nineteenth century had also seen the beginnings of a conservative nationalist reaction in Russia which was hostile to attempts, past and present, to ape developments in the 'West' and which was most articulately expressed in the historical and literary writings of Nikolai Karamzin and the linguistic writings of Admiral Aleksandr Shishkov. 5 The experience of ordinary Russians of the Napoleonic wars had been limited to a degree of financial hardship unless they were unfortunate enough to have been conscripted. The decision of the Orthodox Church in 1806 formally to declare Napoleon the Antichrist may, however, have prepared the ground for the later hostility shown by 'the people' to the invading armies.
Russia in 1812: state and society
The invasion of 1812 required the Russian government to take desperate measures which tested its capacity to mobilise the population and resources to the full. In general, the system (the responsibility for which fell mainly to the Committee of Ministers) managed to cope with the strains without any dangerous outbreak of public disorder (although there were many minor disturbances) or any significant structural
